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This article considers the use of analogies in building and reforming the outer 
space governance regime. It begins by reviewing the historical use of comparisons 
between the ‘target’ domain of outer space and the ‘source’ domains of airspace, 
the seabed, the high seas, and Antarctica. After describing how these analogies 
shaped the Outer Space Treaty, a survey of contemporary literature demonstrates 
that analogies continue to be used to structure thinking about outer space 
activities. The central argument of the article is that analogies are a misleading 
foundation for constructing a governance regime in outer space. They overlook 
essential and distinct features of outer space, and misguide the actions of 
policymakers by influencing interest formation and problem definition. The 
second section identifies six major features of the outer space environment that 
are concealed by other-domain analogies, and describes their impact on the 
requirements for effective governance. The final section presents an alternative, 
non-analogic representation of outer space as a place, and draws some general 
conclusions about its implications for space governance.  
 
 
The suddenness of the Space Age created a new set of challenges for international law, and the 
rules to manage space activity were created before those challenges were fully comprehended. 
Governance preceded understanding. At the opening of negotiations over the Outer Space Treaty 
(OST), “most governments had little conception of space or space activity,” even though Sputnik 
had entered Earth orbital space almost a decade prior.1 Before specific rules and norms for space 
activities could be agreed upon, diplomats first had to establish a shared ‘locational 
classification’ for outer space. Classifying outer space as an arena of activity was necessary to 
allow participating governments to define the situation, identify their interests, and determine 
their identities as space actors. Only then could they pursue the creation of a treaty to manage 
outer space in the interests of each and all. But rather than waiting for a full appreciation and 
understanding of this new domain of activity, key actors relied on analogies with other 
international domains – the ocean, airspace, and Antarctica – to classify outer space. In doing so, 
they misrepresented the problems of collective use of outer space, and misidentified their own 
interests. The result is a dysfunctional outer space regime that persists today, unable to resolve 
key questions and confront emerging issues. This article argues that analogies between space and 
other planetary domains, which still enjoy significant circulation among the space community, 
represent the wrong approach to outer space governance, and risk repeating the mistakes of past 
regime building.   
Although the use of domain analogies for outer space has been studied in great detail, 
existing treatments accept and even embrace this strategy as useful or inevitable.2 Most notable 
is M.J. Peterson’s work on the outer space regime, including a 1997 article in International 
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Organization and her 2005 book International Regimes for the Final Frontier.3 Peterson 
acknowledges that analogies can be judged based on how well they represent the actual domain; 
an analogy can have more or less ‘fit’ with the material realities of outer space. But her historical 
recounting demonstrates in detail that movement between analogies was mostly (if not entirely) 
driven by superior political ‘fit’ with the purposes and interests of dominant actors.4 This can be 
understood as a case of ‘seeing what one wants to see.’ When shifts in power among states and 
interest within states occur, a new analogy with better ‘fit’ is adopted. Peterson under-plays the 
point that the ‘fit’ of any given analogy with material reality changes too, as scientific 
understanding comes into focus. The more we understand about actual outer space, the better we 
can identify what an analogy fails to capture. In neglecting the relationship between analogies 
and material reality, Peterson overlooks the way that scientific knowledge accumulation 
progressively undermines the ‘fit’ of any given analogy with the material context of outer space 
itself. Indeed, the increasingly accurate scientific image of outer space represents an external 
standard with which other domain analogies can be usefully evaluated. 
Contemporary International Relations has been moving in the other direction. Instead of 
harnessing new scientific knowledge about planetary domains to evaluate the utility of social and 
political representations, scholars have embraced the idea that all images of planetary space – 
scientific or otherwise – are social constructions. This approach to outer space is demonstrated 
by Jason Beery’s 2016 article in Political Geography.5 Beery explains the construction of outer 
space as a ‘global commons’ using a “production of nature approach.” He explicitly rejects the 
existence of a “fixed, pre-given, and separate” natural world in favor of an outer space that is 
“socially produced” by inherently political scientific “framings” that serve the interests of 
dominant actors and reinforce inequality.6 Under this view, the analog and the ‘target’ of the 
analogy have equal ontological status; they are both constructed, neither is more ‘real’ than the 
other. Outer space for Beery is defined by its political geography of non-appropriation, free 
access, and collective benefit. He rejects the notion of an objective, material domain, thereby 
relinquishing any scientific standard for evaluating the accuracy of an analogy as a 
representation of the outer space domain.  
 This article adopts an alternative approach, one that emphasizes the special role of 
scientific knowledge in producing a useable and useful ‘locational classification.’ Although this 
may seem like a basic insight, the vast literature on the history of space access underemphasizes 
the influence of geography and geophysics, and what we know about them and when, on space 
activities.7 This article addresses two basic questions: what do analogies overlook or downplay 
about the space domain, and how has their use impacted governance in outer space? I argue that 
a scientific image of the outer space domain highlights its unique material features as a place, in 
contrast to other-domain analogies (ocean, airspace, Antarctica), which tend to elide and obscure 
important features of the outer space environment. This scientific image – which is progressively 
updated in pursuit of an accurate representative of the objective material world – is more useful 
for collective governance, because outer space itself places constraints on what humans can do, 
how they can do it, and the consequences. In other words, the material features of space, 
interacting with technologies of access, shape the practices, interests, and problems that motivate 
the formation and operation of the outer space regime. When the space environment is 
misunderstood and mischaracterized, so are the interests of diverse actors, and the problems 
caused by shared use and free access. The stakes of accurate representation are regime 
effectiveness: when interests and problems are misconceived at the time of regime formation, the 
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result is international laws that inadequately serve the individual space user and larger space 
community. 
 The first section surveys the history of applying other-domain analogies to the 
international governance of outer space. During the first decades of regime formation, space 
actors and international lawyers utilized a rotating set of analogies to import pre-existing legal 
principles, norms, and rules. Despite decades of scientific activity in outer space, these analogies 
are still relied upon for understanding what outer space is like today. The second section outlines 
several ways that the use of analogies shaped the outer space regime in unproductive, and even 
counterproductive, ways. International law of outer space has persisted largely unchanged since 
the 1960s and 1970s, yet space science and science activities have continued to increase and 
advance. This makes the mismatch between space law and space itself increasingly visible. The 
third section connects the scientific, non-analogic, approach to ‘locational classification’ with the 
formation of governance principles and norms to demonstrate how abandoning the use of 
analogies can bring clarity to the agenda for reforming and augmenting contemporary outer 
space governance. 
 
 
Analogies with Outer Space 
 
During the first decades of the Space Age, reliance on other domain analogies prevailed 
in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Until the 
mid-1970s, COPUOS was the “single most important source of international law relating to 
space activities.”8 The committee is divided into a Scientific and Technical subcommittee and a 
Legal subcommittee. The Scientific and Technical subcommittee was charged with developing 
shared knowledge about space and the potentials of space activity, while the Legal subcommittee 
drafted multilateral agreements for collective governance of outer space. The Scientific and 
Technical subcommittee would help define and shape the agenda of the Legal subcommittee, by 
identifying existing and emerging international problems in space. But the Legal subcommittee 
got ahead of its counterpart, fashioning agreements before the work of the Scientific and 
Technical subcommittee could really inform their content. The urgency and high stakes of Cold 
War politics, and the uncertainty about who would achieve space milestones first, drove the 
Soviet Union and United States – the two early space powers – to actively pursue negotiated 
agreements for fear that events, activities, and the precedents they set would take the bipolar 
rivalry in dangerous or disadvantageous directions.  
This urgency empowered the Legal subcommittee to make key decisions about the 
principles, norms, and rules of outer space law. Instead of space experts, it was international 
lawyers – highly trained in analogical reasoning – that had the largest influence on early regime 
formation out of COPUOS.9 Peterson describes how the use of analogies facilitated “direct 
transfers of ideas” from Earth-bound international agreements to the new space regime.10  The 
use of other-domain ideas obtained a kind of momentum early on, and persisted through inertia. 
By the time COPUOS activity slowed down in the late 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of 
technical experts on the committee had decreased in favor of diplomatic generalists, who because 
of their lack of familiarity with the specific features of outer space are more likely to rely on 
cognitive shortcuts like analogy. The overall result was a space regime founded on earthbound 
analogies.11 Three such analogies will be considered: airspace, the ocean, and Antarctica. 
 
4 
 
Airspace 
 The analogy between airspace and outer space had initial intuitive appeal, because of 
their shared ascendant position and the notion that vehicles in either are ‘flying.’ The term 
‘aerospace’ reflects the belief that space is a continuation of airspace, and some legal scholars at 
the beginning of the Space Age proposed that the legal regime for airspace was an important 
precedent for outer space. Problems associated with injury, damage, and loss from space vehicles 
have been described as “identically the same…in international air law.”12 But the airspace 
analogy quickly fell out of favor, and virtually no one forwarded it after 1961. Peterson argues 
that the strongest explanation – a materialist explanation – is the “poorer fit with what was 
known about space,” particularly the basic nature of orbital mechanics.13 The air analogy implied 
that outer space should be divided into national segments treated as sovereign territories, but 
“lawyers and governments alike had trouble conceiving how a country might claim sovereignty 
over a vacuum whose location was constantly shifting.”14 Of course, it was not the vacuum itself 
with a shifting location. Objects in any orbital trajectory, even those that appear stationary 
relatively to a point on Earth, are constantly moving through different points in space. The 
airspace analogy was rejected for the same basic reason physical partitioning of outer space was 
abandoned: sovereign territory makes little sense in the orbital space environment. 
 
Ocean 
The analogy that most dominated the early and middle periods of space activity 
compared outer space to the ocean.15 There are two different versions of this analogy: a 
comparison of space itself with the high seas, and a comparison of celestial bodies (like the 
Moon) with the seabed. The idea that outer space is like the high seas had intuitive appeal, 
because both are vast and fluid, and contain areas of solid material. The comparison was also 
readily available given the on-going negotiations over the Law of the Sea during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. The version of this analogy with the most uptake in the international 
community asserts that outer space is like the high seas, and should therefore be treated as an 
open access area that can be used by everyone, but not appropriated by anyone: a res communis. 
On the high seas, states are ‘flag states,’ responsible for enforcing regulations on their own 
nationals, and especially on ships registered in their state. The view that outer space was like 
high seas was used to define the political-geographical border between outer space (understood 
as high seas) and airspace (understood as territorial seas).16 As a result of this analogy, a 
significant amount of ocean governance precedent was transferred to the outer space regime, 
especially obligations associated with ships and crews, such as those regarding rescue, piracy, 
navigational aids, liability, and registration.17 The basic regime regarding spaceflight is modeled 
on the idea of high seas’ freedoms (of access) and flag state jurisdiction. 
The high seas analogy also implied a parallel between islands in the ocean, and ‘islands 
in space.’18 While islands in the ocean were historically territorialized, international lawyers and 
diplomats did not want celestial bodies to be characterized as res nullius and be subject to state 
appropriation. Neither side of the ‘space race’ knew who would get to such places first, so both 
preferred a principle of non-appropriation of celestial bodies. Because islands in the Earth’s 
ocean were treated as res nullius and therefore subject to appropriation, the argument that moons 
and asteroids should not be understood this way required an analogy shift. During the late 1970s, 
in negotiations for the Moon Agreement, celestial bodies were compared to the non-coastal 
seabed which had been declared the ‘common heritage of mankind’ in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. This public ownership model reserved the mineral resources of the deep seabed for the 
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international community as a whole and included a distributional mandate. Indeed, the Moon 
Agreement has many institutional features – principles, norms, and rules – drawn directly from 
the provisions for the International Seabed Authority. But the Moon Agreement is ineffective, 
having never been ratified by any major space actor. The outer space regime largely embeds 
another analogy to address the status of celestial bodies. Instead of being treated like islands (res 
nullius) or the seabed (res publica), the outer space regime treats celestial bodies as akin to 
Antarctica. 
 
Antarctica 
The analogy between outer space and Antarctica became salient towards the end of 
negotiations over OST, and “supplied solutions to a number of practical problems” for space 
users.19 Comparisons between the southern continent and outer space already existed in the 
public consciousness, as both places were understood as ‘last frontiers’ and formidable natural 
obstacles to potentially lucrative exploration and development. James Spiller describes how the 
outer space/Antarctica analogy was activated and made prominent as a strategic government 
narrative, picked up by the popular media, and designed to “garner public support for these 
strategic national initiatives and, more generally, for American Cold War internationalism.”20 
The analogy with Antarctica was not chosen for its material accuracy, but because the 
connection was “culturally salient,” and a way to tie past American mastery of terrestrial 
frontiers to Cold War activities.21 Comparing outer space and Antarctica served strategic national 
interests: both programs were motivated by national defense, military advantage, and 
international prestige. Both represented grand challenges that could prove the power and 
capability of a superpower and its political-economic system.22  
The legacy of this analogy is apparent in both domestic and international institutions. 
Spiller identifies “organizational similarities” between NASA and the U.S. Antarctica Program, 
and notes that diplomats in each area continued to draw “energy and lessons” from one another 
for many decades.23 On the international level, the Antarctic Treaty System – which came into 
being in 1959 – was understood as a test for principles and norms to be applied to outer space.24 
The Antarctic Treaty placed competing territorial claims in abeyance and reserved the continent 
for peaceful, and especially scientific, purposes. It demonstrated a path for avoiding militarized 
superpower conflict in a new planetary domain. Some scholars of outer space argue that the 
Antarctic Treaty System served as the analogical “base model” for the outer space regime.25 Like 
the Antarctic Treaty, the OST replaces the assumption of res nullius with a principle of res 
communis, but with states retaining control over national objects and people.26 And like the 
Antarctica Treaty, the OST also enshrines a right of peaceful scientific research and prohibits 
weapons of mass destruction in orbit and on celestial bodies. 
Comparison between outer space and Antarctica was not limited to historical, political, 
and legal dimensions. Even though the analogy was not chosen for its material accuracy, 
Spiller’s account illustrates how a material comparison was treated as valid and useful. In the 
same month that OST became open for signature (January 1967), NASA officials visited 
Antarctica in order to learn about maintaining human exploration in a harsh environment, on one 
of the two remaining ‘last frontiers’. Because of its environment, Antarctica was considered an 
“ideal testing ground” for equipment, infrastructure, and logistics that might be used in outer 
space.27 It was assumed that biological life in general, and human life in particular, face the same 
types of challenges in Antarctica and outer space. This analogy extended to the relationship 
between the geophysical environment and technological capabilities; nuclear propulsion was 
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understood to be equally revolutionary for icebreaker ships and rockets to space, such that access 
to either would be cheap and easy.28 
It was not the discovery of material differences that caused that comparison between 
outer space and Antarctica to fade. Spiller argues that the analogy broke down during the 1970s 
because the government relied on two different explanations for why lofty expectations for 
exploitation of each remained unfulfilled. The common narrative about a resource bonanza 
needed to be replaced. While the framing of Antarctica shifted to protection of an 
environmentally fragile region, the framing of outer space remained focused on economic 
advantage, but reoriented to more Earth-bound benefits like jobs, spinoff technologies, and the 
uses of satellite monitoring data.29 While Antarctica needed to be kept pollution-free, outer space 
was not understood to be at risk from pollution. Spiller explains that the main reason that the 
Antarctic analogy did not cause a “paradigm shift” in thinking about space was that there were 
“too many interests committed to a more robust program and too many people attached to the 
romantic idea of the space frontier.”30 In other words, the analogy was prominent when it served 
strategic national interests, and abandoned when it did not. When it was employed, it was 
assumed to extend to both material and political aspects of outer space. 
Analogies to the outer space domain are still widely deployed in the speeches of 
policymakers, arguments of diplomats, reports of analysts, and studies of scholars. Indeed, in 
2014 the journal Astropolitics published a special issue on the ‘Power of Analogies for 
Advancing Space Scientific Knowledge.’31 Many such analogies are fined-grained, in that they 
compare a very narrow aspect of the history of space access to another type of earthbound 
activity. The special issue of Astropolitics purportedly focuses on analogies that relate to 
spaceflight.32 Some of these articles introduce new analogies, such as a comparison between 
spaceflight and mountaineering, and between the space program and the railroads.33 Others 
unpack broad historical analogies, such as between the American western frontier and the space 
program and Antarctica and outer space as places.34 Material comparisons emerge throughout, 
such as the reliance on Earth geology as training for lunar geology, and the extrapolations from 
Earth biology to astrobiology.35 The position articulated here does not reject such analogizing 
wholesale; comparisons between government programs, popular reactions, funding models, and 
other social and political realities can be illuminating. But broad material comparisons are 
misleading: outer space is not a place like any other. Yet wholesale analogies between the outer 
space environment and the ocean, Antarctica, and airspace still pervade contemporary thinking. 
These comparisons appear fundamentally plausible and helpful, because each place is (or was) 
coded as a frontier and a global commons. But the particular analogy chosen still depends on 
what aspect of outer space activities is focused on, and what interests and goals are represented 
by the author. A cursory review of the outer space literature reveals as much. 
Comparisons with airspace and the high seas are especially common in the security 
realm, and tend to structure approaches to power projection and war fighting in space.36 The high 
seas analogy has been used to argue in favor of U.S. policing activities, Chinese strategies related 
to ‘space control,’ and the legitimacy of space-based power and conflict more generally.37 
References to the Law of the Sea Convention are especially common, and have been used to 
justify private asteroid mining, to propose a legal model for utilization of lunar resources, and to 
argue for the creation of national exclusion zones.38 The Antarctic analogy is forwarded by 
Spiller as a way to bring space activity ‘back to Earth’ and abandon more visionary frontier-
ism.39 Even the basic airspace analogy persists – the contrast between physical atmosphere and 
abstract airspace has been used to explain how a res communis regime can coexist with 
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sovereign territory in outer space.40 Each analogy is used to argue in favor of a particular 
political, economic, or military action. 
The initial use of analogies to understand the outer space environment in the 1960s and 
1970s could be taken to indicate a lack of confidence in straightforward descriptions of this new 
domain of human activity. But their continued prevalence is difficult to understand, given that 
scientific knowledge of the space environment has improved markedly since the early days of the 
Space Age. Indeed, it has been claimed that analogies should be used now because they were 
used in the past.41 Reliance on analogies could be accounted for by the fact that very few who 
discuss space activities and issues will ever actually travel there, but the same can be said for the 
domains that have been the source of such analogies. The reason analogies are so common is the 
same reason that they are potentially harmful: an analogy can be used to make a preferred 
strategy or policy look more suited to the space environment than it really is. The next section 
reviews some basic misconceptions about the space environment that persist because of reliance 
on other-domain analogies. 
 
 
Risks of Analogical Thinking 
The basic attraction of analogies is that they make familiar the otherwise unfamiliar, and 
are therefore a source of guidance for confronting new situations. They are stronger than 
metaphors, which simply guide one’s orientation, in that analogies suggest that “causal or 
evaluative beliefs” can be transferred from the familiar to the unfamiliar.42 Analogies therefore 
serve as a vehicle for importing pre-existing legal principles, norms, and rules, but also ideas 
about what is happening in space, why it is happening, and why that matters. This is an 
inherently flawed strategy for constructing a political geography, because the material context of 
the ocean, air, and frozen continent are not the same as the orbital space environment. If specifics 
of the outer space environment and the nature of outer space activities are very different, why 
should we expect other sources of international law to work for the space environment? This 
section seeks to demonstrate how the three main analogies are misleading sources of information 
about the space environment. 
None of these analogies is useful or appropriate for fully defining the political situation in 
outer space, because each source domain lacks the basic structural features of the target domain. 
It might be argued that analogies, by definition, contain only partial identity with or similarity to 
the target domain, and that what they do capture about reality justifies their use. The problem is 
that analogies are used as an expedient to understand situations without much information, so 
users are poorly suited to identify which parts of a given analogy are revealing, and which are 
concealing. Indeed, when analogies are first employed, the user assumes that “the target domain 
is similar in all respects to the source domain,” and use of analogies reduces the incentive to 
ascertain facts about the target domain – the outer space environment.43 This entails a high 
probability of misreading, misperception, and mistakes in problem definition and interest 
formation. In other words, analogies provide a poor conceptual foundation for regime building. 
There are six major features of the orbital space environment that other domain analogies 
overlook or distort: lack of ecology, lack of fluidity, distribution of access technology, nature of 
movement, infinite frontier, and existential impacts. 
 
Lack of Ecology 
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Unlike the ocean and Antarctica, Earth orbital space and our Solar System seem to 
contain no ecology – no ecosystems, no endemic life whatsoever. Even if ecosystems are 
discovered on Mars or the moons of Jupiter or Saturn, they are unlikely to be active, pervasive, 
and complex, compared to ecosystems on Earth. When this fact is recognized, it is usually used 
to argue that the outer space environment is especially resilient and there is no one to harm.44 But 
in many ways the opposite is true, because ecosystems contain properties of self-sustainability 
and renewal that can moderate and regulate the impacts of human activities. Animals reproduce, 
carbon can be sequestered, ice refreezes, toxins disperse, and even continental crust is renewed. 
Outer space does not contain ecological sources of renewal and stabilization; it is fragile and has 
limited capacity to repair itself.45 Space debris cannot be removed the same way the Chesapeake 
Bay can be cleaned of pollution: there are no filter feeding bivalves in orbit. Lack of ecosystems 
also means that outer space does not contain harvestable, renewable, resources that can go 
extinct. The features of these types of resources give unique meaning to ‘sustainable use.’ 
Indeed, almost no material resources – finite or renewable – have been harvested from space. 
The space resources currently used are spatial extension resources, like orbital paths and ballistic 
missile trajectories. Even these are unlike sea and air lanes, in that their traversal does not entail 
negative externalities for ecosystems. This creates significantly different conditions for achieving 
sustainable access and use. It also represents a unique context for treaty negotiations – in the 
ocean, valuable and readily accessible resources were at stake, whereas in outer space, resources 
tend to be speculative or difficult to access, especially in the near term.46  
 
Lack of Fluidity 
Unlike the ocean and atmosphere, outer space is not a fluid domain in the sense of having 
‘flows’ of liquid or gaseous particles.47 Water, air, and vacuum behave very differently. The 
atmosphere and ocean contain winds and currents – driven by density, heat, and pressure 
gradients, the Earth’s rotation, the gravitational attraction of the Moon, and other material 
properties – which create patterns of dynamism and circulation within those domains. These 
dynamic flows shape patterns of ecosystem productivity, distribute external inputs like pollution, 
and make the borders between such domains fuzzy and fluid. The edges of the atmosphere, 
ocean, and land are shaped by molecular movements and exchanges in and between each 
domain, and are constantly in flux due to erosion, deposition, runoff, industrial emissions, and 
sea surface exchange. The natural borders between each domain are highly porous, and for the 
purposes of effective international management of environmental problems, they are largely 
artificial. 
In contrast, terrestrial, aerial, and maritime activities barely affect orbital space, and if 
they do at all, it is through explicit and intentional launches from an earthbound domain to an 
outer space one. The border with outer space is uncertain, but it is not understood to be 
undergoing constant fluctuation and exchange like the coastline or sea surface. The only 
exception to this is when solar flares heat the Earth’s outer atmosphere, causing it to temporarily 
expand. But this dynamism is miniscule and momentary compared to other domains. Because 
orbital space lacks currents and flows akin to terrestrial domains, the nature of pollution is 
fundamentally different. In outer space, uncontrolled and ‘cast off’ objects in tend to spread out 
evenly in a shell around the Earth. Such pollution, called ‘space debris,’ does not arrive in orbital 
space unintentionally, easily, or thoughtlessly, as terrestrial pollution often enters the land, 
atmosphere, or ocean.  
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Distribution of Access Technology 
Space technology, and the way it facilitates access and activity in space, is fundamentally 
different from aerial and maritime technologies. Take the example of vehicles. ‘Ships’ are 
designed for operation in all three non-terrestrial domains, but their common name is more 
analogy than equivalence.48 Aircraft and watercraft – commercial, military, recreational – are 
durable and reusable. In the case of boats, the technology may be very basic, and is highly 
diffused across the planet. Although aircraft are more complicated and expensive, they are 
usually flown for several decades before being decommissioned. In contrast, space access 
technology is extremely expensive, complex, and fragile. Many space vehicles, such as rockets, 
are ‘single use,’ and even reusable space vehicles require significant repair and refurbishment 
between trips. Although this is not necessarily a permanent condition of space vehicle 
technology, the difference in operational environments increases the barriers to robust, reusable, 
and cost effective spacecraft. The material and manufacture of space vehicles is not comparable 
to aircraft or watercraft; space vehicles can be weaker in some ways, for example because they 
do not encounter terrestrial weather, but they need to be stronger in others, such as shielding 
from radiation.  
These technological differences are significant, because they result in different numbers, 
distributions, and types of users. The more distinctive and expensive a technology, the fewer 
actors have access to it. Distribution factors affect the political conditions for an evolving outer 
space regime. Depending on the issue at hand, the small number of space users may have vastly 
more or less leverage. While space actors create precedent and normalize practices, the rest 
(majority) of the international community can advocate for technology transfer and profit 
redistribution. Features of space access technology also impact the prospects for regulatory 
strategies. For example, the question of how and whether to ‘flag’ a space vehicle via permanent 
markings was an important part of the negotiations over registration.49 Flagging a boat and 
painting an aircraft proved far easier than marking a vehicle that travels through the atmosphere 
at extremely high speeds and temperatures. In the early 1970s, the COPUOS Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee concluded “there was no feasible way to put marks capable of 
surviving the high heat of reentry on space objects and their components.”50 Although the outer 
space regime borrowed the model of flag state jurisdiction from the law of the sea, outer space 
vehicles could not replicate the practice of physically flagging a ship. 
 
Movement  
 In a 2007 article in Astropolitics entitled “On War in Space,” Howard Kleinberg argues 
that the “nature of presence” is different in outer space.51 In general, being in space means 
moving at high speeds. Kleinberg points to the operation of space vehicles, which requires 
extreme velocities and complex movement in three-dimensions. Vehicles in orbit circumnavigate 
the entire planet, quickly and from a vantage point. Interactions between space objects are 
typically done in passing because of the difficulties of syncing up velocities. The space media is 
unlike other domains because it lacks “surface features, seabeds, or coastal geography to limit 
motion.” Nothing in space itself can be claimed, flagged, or partitioned in a physical, static, and 
permanent manner. Kleinberg uses these basic insights to reject theories of land-based warfare as 
applicable to space warfare, but these features of space also demonstrate that space-based 
operations are generally very different from those on Earth. 
 
Infinite Frontier 
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 The image of the frontier implies a fundamental similarity between the history of human 
access to land, atmosphere, ocean, and space. In each planetary domain, humans used advancing 
technology to access new resources and territorialize new spaces. The vision of outer space as 
the ‘final frontier’ implies big payoffs for intrepid explorers, and a way for sovereign states to 
advance their power and prestige. But the frontier analogy elides the nature of distance in outer 
space. It implies that the mineral resources on celestial bodies are “accessible, no farther beyond 
our grasp than the oil beneath the Beaufort” Sea.52 Many tantalizing space resources, and 
especially the prospect of colonies, are out of reach of the physiological limitations of the human 
body (without major technological innovation). Space travel outside the solar system would 
exceed the human life span. For humans to survive in outer space, all the basic features of the 
Earth environment must be recreated and maintained. Although other frontiers, like Antarctica 
and the deep ocean, were rugged and challenging, those frontiers were a part of the Earth’s 
planetary system and therefore similar or proximate to livable parts of the planet. Those frontiers 
also have physical edges and ends which are finite and knowable. Outer space is theoretically 
and practically infinite, a frontier that can never really be crossed. 
 
Existential Impacts 
 Outer space contains and entails existential risks for the human species, and possibly all 
life on Earth. Natural hazards from the land, ocean, and atmosphere – all planetary domains – 
include volcanism, extreme weather, earthquakes, tsunamis, and the disruption of natural 
systems by human activities. The outer space environment presents a different suite of natural 
hazards. Outer space itself is extremely dangerous; cosmic radiation is unfiltered by atmosphere, 
and cosmic debris moves at high speeds. The environmental risk of asteroids and comets extends 
to the Earth as well. Collision with the Earth represents a low frequency, extremely high 
magnitude threat to human survival unparalleled in the other planetary domains. 
 
Table 1. Analogies for Outer Space. 
Analogy Version What it captures What it misses Presence in regime 
Ocean High seas Vast, fluid; 
Solid islands; 
Obstacles to deep access; 
Coastal area (airspace) 
Infinite; 
Effective distance (speed of 
vehicles); 
Delicate and expensive 
technology; 
Security issues; 
Space ports (leave, don’t 
arrive) 
National registration; 
International commons; 
CIL principles instead of 
positive rules; 
Rescue obligations 
Ocean/Land Seabed Vast potential mineral 
wealth; 
Obstacles to access 
Infinite; 
No ecological context; 
Separate mineral caches; 
Abundance of helium 
Moon Treaty (CHM) 
Land Antarctica Harsh environment;  
Fragile environment; 
unknown resource extent;  
Distance; 
Uninhabited except for few 
settlements 
 
Infinite; 
Mostly unable to partition; 
Requirement of advanced 
technology 
International commons;  
National control over 
humans, vehicles, stations; 
functional coordination 
comes first; scientific 
cooperation 
Atmosphere Airspace Ascendance and ‘flying’;  
Vehicle safety issues;  
Vehicle registration needs 
Infinite; 
Orbital mechanics; 
Obstacles to partition 
Liability rules 
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Analogies between the outer space environment and Earth’s land, ocean, or atmosphere 
are misleading. Because planetary and extra-planetary domains are fundamentally different from 
one other, it is not likely that regime features designed to govern one domain will be effective 
when applied to another. The distinctive features of the ocean, atmosphere, Antarctica, and outer 
space entail different constraints, opportunities, and motivations for regime building.53 The 
actors with influence and stakes are different, as are the consequences of poor governance. 
Analogies are therefore unlikely to inform durable and effective solutions to collective problems 
in outer space, because they import rules, norms, and principles from regimes designed for 
fundamentally different places. Spatial disorientation makes for difficult steering. 
 
Outer Space as a Place 
Analogies are intended to make new situations or things familiar and understandable, but 
eventually they can be replaced with direct information about their target. The processes of 
scientific knowledge production and technological advancement have continued for decades after 
the construction of the outer space regime; our abilities in and understandings of the space 
environment are significantly advanced relative to the 1960s. Analogies are no longer necessary 
to provide a ‘locational classification’ for outer space. Scientific and technical experts generally 
comprehend the basic physical features and patterns of the outer space environment. The image 
of outer space described in this section reflects the basic features of their consensus. 
Gravity is the dominant force shaping the material context in outer space, and especially 
the areas surrounding celestial objects. Gravity shapes the outer space environment near Earth in 
two major ways: by creating pathways for continuous high velocity travel around the planet, and 
by making travel into space very energetically burdensome. Earth orbital space – the part of 
space where the Earth’s gravitational attraction is overwhelmingly dominant – is better 
understood as the outer layer of the planet, as opposed to the nearest areas of the infinite 
universe. Virtually everything humans have done in space has occurred in the so-called ‘gravity 
well,’ a conceptual metaphor that describes the fact that gravitational attraction falls off in a non-
linear relationship to distance. This feature of gravity means that the bulk of the energy required 
to get somewhere in space is expended in the early stages of escaping Earth’s gravitational pull. 
 Although orbital space is vastly larger than the atmosphere in total volume, the increase 
in speed made possible because of lack of friction means that distance is compressed. Outer 
space travel represents a decrease in “effective distance”: even very long distances can be 
traversed quickly when traveling at very high speeds 54. This speed of travel makes space 
attractive for military and potentially commercial users. But high speeds are not just required in 
space, they are necessary for most space activities. The supposed cornucopia of space resources 
and habitats are scattered at huge distances from the Earth. Achieving a stable orbit requires 
reaching orbital velocity, which depends on the mass of the object to be orbited. Orbital velocity 
for the Earth is at least 17,500 miles per hour. At this velocity, an object can circumnavigate the 
planet in about 90 minutes. There are several different types of orbit, or paths that a satellite can 
take in its revolutions around the Earth. Orbital paths have three features: height, eccentricity 
(near-circular or elliptical), and inclination (angle relative to equator). The choice of orbit 
depends on the use of the satellite. Because satellites sit outside Earth’s atmosphere and above 
the terrestrial environment, they have positional advantages that makes them attractive for many 
different uses. 
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The environment of outer space is overwhelmingly inhospitable to human life, and 
creates a set of obstacles for the operation and maintenance of human technology. Outer space is 
difficult to get to, be in, and return from. Because it is a vacuum, terrestrial organisms cannot 
live in outer space without the assistance of advanced technology. Space-based objects 
experience enormous variation in temperature, depending on their location relative to the Sun. 
Outside of the protective filter of the atmosphere, radiation abounds. The ‘solar wind’ entails a 
continuous and high-velocity flow of charged particles from the sun, with occasional eruptions of 
intense high-energy radiation called ‘solar flares.’ An additional source of radiation is ‘cosmic 
rays’ from outside the solar system. These high-energy particles travel an appreciable fraction of 
the speed of light, and can do massive damage to biological tissue. Such radiation flows through 
orbital space, but it is also concentrated there. The Van Allen belts are dense layers of charged 
particles held around the Earth by its magnetic field, which can also do damage to humans and 
human technology. This environment makes human spaceflight very difficult biologically, and 
requires that everything done in space (with or without humans) include elaborate shielding. We 
must do artificially what the atmosphere does naturally. This vastly increases the cost of doing 
things in space, and has encouraged a shift from human to robot-based activity. 
 Space vehicle technology faces three major tasks: escaping gravity to reach orbital space, 
maintaining structural integrity while there, and in some cases, safely returning to Earth through 
the atmosphere. Each step entails significant design and materials requirements for space 
vehicles. Launching requires powerful rockets and large amounts of fuel, and high launch costs 
have persisted throughout the Space Age and obstructed the diffusion of access to space. The 
approximate cost of putting a pound in orbit is $10,000, and roughly 85 percent of a rocket’s 
weight at the launch pad is fuel.55 Because the pull of gravity is consistent, reducing launch costs 
can only be achieved by decreasing the weight of payloads to minimize the amount of fuel 
required, or through reusable vehicles. Operations in orbit require fuel and situational awareness, 
to maintain orbits and to avoid dangerous space debris. Re-entry seems like the easy part, 
because vehicles are moving in the direction gravity pulls them. But moving from frictionless 
space into a friction-filled atmosphere is arduous, because friction causes a great increase in 
temperature. Indeed, space vehicles become sheathed in plasma for part of re-entry. This requires 
materials that can withstand extreme heat and pressure. 
Celestial bodies are a large physical outer space resource. In addition to the planets that 
orbit our Sun and other stars, and the moons that orbit those planets, asteroids populate the space 
environment. Humans have only known about asteroids for around 200 years, and initially they 
were a curiosity for astronomers. In the past three decades, however, scientists have increasingly 
catalogued ‘near Earth objects’ (asteroids and comets) that may present a risk of collision with 
the Earth. In these same decades, scientists first learned “the basic physical properties of 
asteroids, such as rotation rate, size, shape, composition, and origin.”56 This knowledge – made 
possible by innovations in electronics and computing – supported the conceptualization of 
asteroids as a resource to be mined by humans.57 In comparison to other celestial bodies, 
asteroids are relatively accessible, have negligible gravity, and are therefore easy to move and 
easy to leave. Many of them are known to contain valuable minerals, and comets may contain 
useful materials like water, methane, and ammonia. 
 This brief sketch of a non-analogical representation of outer space illustrates a variety of 
conditions that shape outer space activities. The space environment creates durable and 
predictable material trends regarding launch requirements, orbital paths, human physiological 
limitations, remote sensing and communication physics, and other features of space activity. The 
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space environment contains valuable resources, with spatial extension resources (like orbital 
position) closer to Earth and harvestable resources (like minerals) scattered across huge 
distances. The movement of celestial bodies like asteroids represents an opportunity, by making 
mineral resources more accessible, and a threat, because they periodically collide with the Earth. 
Movement is the norm for objects in space, and most uncontrolled objects do not slow or 
accumulate, but instead are spread and multiplied by orbital dynamics. These features of outer 
space activity are immune to shifts in interests or distribution of power among states. They affect 
the motivations for and requirements of space access, including what resources space 
technologies are designed to pursue, and the features and cost of those technologies. The outer 
space material context also determines what kinds of threats exist (who they threaten and how), 
including space weapons, space debris, and asteroid collision. These features of the space 
environment ought to set the agenda of regime formation for outer space, but when analogies are 
used, they can be downplayed or overlooked. 
There are several general conclusions from the constraints and opportunities of the space 
material context described above. First, the nature of space access makes the public-private 
relationship something different than that envisioned by early regime builders. Major states were 
concerned about sovereign appropriation of outer space in the 1960s and 1970s, but gave little 
thought to the potential of uncontrolled private actors in space. The regime reflects as much: 
although it explicitly rules out national territorial claims, many argue that it allows for 
privatization of harvested resources. Indeed, there is an “almost comprehensive absence of 
substantive provisions specifically circumscribing private space activities,” so the regime is 
essentially permissive.58 Private actors have wide latitude in their choice of registry, and the state 
of registry assumes ultimate liability if anything goes wrong. The shift to private space actors 
relates to the material context of outer space. Access technology is advanced and expensive, but 
has remained generally the same for decades. Launch and orbit is therefore accessible to anyone 
with enough money. And because mineral resources are high risk and high reward, entrepreneurs 
are more likely and able to pursue the massive speculative investments required, compared to 
states with ample domestic responsibilities. The activities and claims of private commercial 
actors are enabled by the current regime, and likely to cause new conflict in outer space 
governance. The flag state model that governs the public-private relationship in space was 
borrowed from the law of the sea. 
Second, space objects cannot be outlawed based on their potential for harm; anything can 
be a space weapon. This situation results from the fragile nature of satellites, their easy-to-target 
ascendant position, and the high velocities of orbital operation. The OST prohibits weapons of 
mass destruction in orbit, and attempts to outlaw space weapons generally by requiring that 
‘space activities’ and ‘space objects’ must be for peaceful purposes. But the majority of space 
technology is ‘dual use,’ meaning that it is difficult to distinguish objects based on their potential 
for peaceful or aggressive use.59 Any object in space can damage a satellite or space vehicle by 
running into it, and it would be very difficult to distinguish an accidental collision from an 
intentional one. There is a problem of discrimination, where a test or targeted use may 
indiscriminately harm non-target users. There is also a problem of attribution, because the 
prevalence of ambient and dangerous space debris increases the risk of unintentional damage, 
which may be misperceived as intentional and planned. Anything in space can be used as a 
weapon, and it can be difficult to tell whether it was a weapon even after the damage occurs. 
This distinctiveness issue does not exist in the ocean, atmosphere, or Antarctica, and is 
overlooked or ignored by the OST regime. 
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Third, the orbital environment is subject to rapid degradation. The construction of the 
OST regime occurred during a period of ignorance about the geophysical-technological 
interaction that creates the space debris problem. NASA scientists recognized the hazard of 
natural space debris in the early 1960s, but anthropogenic debris was not an object of focused 
research until the mid-1970s.60 The problem of multiplying orbital space debris was first 
described by NASA scientists Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais in their 1978 paper 
“Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt.” The phenomenon of 
‘breeding’ or multiplying debris became known as the “Kessler Syndrome.” According to 
Kessler himself, “nobody believed it initially.”61 The idea of risk and limitation in orbital space 
contradicted the prevailing view that space was a “limitless environment” and a “virtually 
infinite sink for pollution.”62 At the time of regime formation, the high seas analogy did not 
invite consideration of the risk of environmental pollution. During this period, the ocean was 
conceived as a “great neutralizer, with virtually unlimited ability to absorb noxious substances.”63 
But even if pollution had been a salient feature of analogies at the time, space debris is a 
qualitatively different type of pollution problem because of its origins, how it spreads, and the 
limited and extremely slow means by which it is naturally removed through orbital decay. 
Finally, the problem of catastrophic and existential risks from asteroid collision is neither 
acknowledged nor addressed by the outer space regime. None of the domain analogies drawn 
upon during its formation capture the magnitude of this threat. Collision is now generally 
understood to be inevitable, but this realization emerged after the core elements of the OST 
regime were negotiated. Astronomers in the 1980s began to realize that near Earth objects were 
numerous, and many came “uncomfortably close to Earth.”64. Humanity has a clear, definite 
collective interest in preparing for the detection and diversion of collision scenarios: “An 
asteroid or comet is the only natural disaster that can wipe out human society and the only 
natural disaster that human society can prevent.”65 And because the development and 
deployment of deflection techniques requires a long lead-time, starting now is imperative to 
avoid the risk of asteroid collision.66 Continued reliance on analogies will not effectively account 
for this threat. Even if it were compared with Earth-based or anthropogenic catastrophe 
scenarios, the risk of asteroid collision has an essential and unique feature: unlike most natural 
disasters, “cosmic hazards are unusual in that they are not spatially selective…any point on the 
planet appears to have a similar chance of being struck.”67 This randomness makes the threat 
seem diffuse, when it is actually very acute in the places that are struck, with reverberating 
consequences that damage surrounding regions. This situation creates a special need and 
challenge for regime building, one that could be overlooked when relying on other domain 
analogies. 
 
Conclusion 
The central argument of this article is that using direct scientific evidence to construct a 
representation of the outer space environment is superior to relying on analogical comparisons 
with various planetary domains. Specifically, using an image of space that does not depend on 
analogy is a better ‘locational classification’ on which to base the international law of outer 
space. Because a representation from direct evidence takes longer to piece together – to collect 
data and construct and test theories – resisting reliance on analogies may have the effect of 
discouraging hasty conclusions about what is and will happen in space, and what needs to be 
done. And when rules are made and practices normalized, they may better reflect a sober and 
informed understanding about consequences for the space environment. Because domain 
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analogies historically shifted with interest and power, members of the international community 
built the outer space regime that seemed most advantageous to their state or bloc, as opposed to 
the regime that best matched the material context of outer space. Although that ‘ship has sailed’ 
historically, the argument outlined here ought to inform additional regime building for space. 
Scholars of different types of space activity may draw different conclusions about the 
implications of outer space as a place for policymaking, international law, and grand strategy. 
But the conclusions they draw about ‘what we should do’ will be better for achieving collective 
goals, and avoiding shared vulnerabilities, if they are based on a realistic and scientific 
representation of outer space as a place. 
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